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Malaya and the Commonwealth

ON August 31st Malaya becomes an independent member of the Commonwealth. Ten years after India and Pakistan, Malaya this summer joins the Asian group of Commonwealth members. There will now be four Asian Prime Ministers around the Commonwealth Conference table. The balance of power within this family of nations will shift one step further in the direction of an Afro-Asian majority.

Then Malaya as a full member will fill a gap in the Commonwealth spectrum, in the range of regional outlooks represented in the Councils of this family of 600m. There is the European, Indian, Australian, African and North American viewpoint. Now with Malaya there will be an opinion represented in Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conferences of the peoples of East Asia.

Racially, too, the Commonwealth will take on a new dimension. The other half of Asia to the Indian sub-continent will now speak. For the first time the representatives of freely elected Malays and Chinese will be heard at Commonwealth Conferences. In time it may be that a Chinese Prime Minister may sit next to his African, Indian and European colleagues.

But Malaya will be more than an extra vote in the global orientation of the Commonwealth. The views of Kuala Lumpur in foreign policy will be an important addition to the picture of international relations within the continent of Asia.

What, for instance, will Malaya's relations be with her neighbours, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam? Already there are signs that Malaya and Indonesia will seek to work closely together. And this in itself will have some interesting cross-currents. Will the Chinese of Indonesia, economically important, but politically ineffective, try to link up with the Chinese element in Malaya?

And how will some Indonesian views on democracy harmonise with the espousal of parliament-

ary democracy in Malaya. President Soekarno's distrust of full freedom being accorded to the nation's elected representatives is not likely to be shared by Malaya, with 'Merdeka' meaning, to them, freedom and not manipulation.

Relations between Malaya and Thailand will see an interaction of a different nature. Tengku Rahman and Marshall Phibun are likely to enjoy a harmony in outlook. But how will a noisy, lively, debating society in a free Malaya affect the rigid controlled 'democracy' of Thailand?

American policy in South Vietnam has a strongly colonial flavour. Dr. Diem echoes all the best anti-Peking phrases of Senator Knowland and his friends. It is likely that Kuala Lumpur and dSaigon are going to have to agree to disagree on many aspects of foreign policy in East Asia.

Finally, of course, there is the immensely important point of Malaya's relations with India and China. Delhi will welcome Malaya into the Commonwealth. It will mean another Asian partner, and within the family of nations, a guarantee for the over half a million Malayan citizens of Indian descent. The Malayan Prime Minister's political outlook is to the right of Mr. Nehru. But undoubtedly Malaya will work closely with India, a democracy to the north-west protecting her flank.

To the north-east China affords no such protection. But there are signs that Peking will not attempt to embarrass the Government of Tengku Rahman. There is a chance, when the Emergency is over, that with discreet and friendly aid from Britain and India, China and Malaya will come to some working understanding.

However, all these are matters for the future. On August 31st the emphasis in Kuala Lumpur will be on progress achieved. And Malaya will begin her life as an independent country, confident of the support of her Commonwealth partners.

COLIN JACKSON

ZANZIBAR LANDSLIDE

THE complete rout of the Arab-dominated Nationalist party in the recent Zanzibar elections surprised even those who realised that they had been steadily losing ground in recent months. Not only did they fail to win a single seat in the six contests, but they were soundly defeated. Their leader, Sheikh Ali Muhsin, obtaining only 918 votes in one of the town wards, compared with 3,328 votes for his Afro-Shirazi opponent. The Afro-Shirazis, whose leadership is linked with Tanganyika African politics, won three seats; the Shirazis (of mixed African descent, but long settled in Zanzibar) two seats, and a Moslem Independent one seat.

The shock to Arab susceptibilities must be considerable. For centuries they have dominated Zanzibar and the rulers, coming, oddly enough, from Oman, although very much on the fringes of the Arab world, are definitely part of it. Arabs send their sons to study at Cairo or Khartoum, the Arab radio can be heard, and during the Suez crisis young Arab internationalists decked their houses with mourning and displayed portraits of Nasser.

Yet the Arabs fought on a multi-racial platform, for which they themselves had asked. They clearly supposed that their traditional leadership could be maintained, in spite of their numerical inferiority. But blood has proved stronger than history, or perhaps it is that those primarily of African descent (most Zanzibaris have some admixture) really felt that they had no wish to be drawn into the Arab whirlpool. The election results are an assertion that the majority of Zanzibaris see their fortune as part of East Africa, not as an outpost of the Middle East.

It is to be hoped that the Arabs, particularly their gifted young spokesman, Ali Muhsin, will not turn sour, but will accept the verdict of the electorate and work with their opponents for the domestic betterment of Zanzibar.

WEST INDIAN CAPITAL

THE British and American Governments have more obvious reason for immediate satisfaction at the result of the London talks in July on the West Indian federal capital site than the West Indians themselves. The Americans secured from West Indian representatives recognition of their need for a defence base in the Eastern Caribbean, without giving in return any undertaking in regard to their base on the northwest peninsula in Trinidad where the West Indians want to build the capital. This West Indian recognition relieves the British Government also of an embarrassment since the base was leased in 1941 as part of an Anglo-American wartime deal completed without local consultation. Now, as a result of the London

talks, it can be argued that the deal has been locally underwritten, in principle at least.

There is to be a joint commission, but its terms of reference are very general. It is merely asked 'to investigate all aspects of the British West Indian request to make Chaguanas available, taking into full account military and economic considerations.'

The British Government has been less than candid, endeavouring to play the 'honest broker's' role between the Americans and the West Indians, regardless of its original share of responsibility for the present situation. Nevertheless, the issue will ultimately lie between the two. When the West Indians gain their promised independence, it is local public opinion that will, by all precedent, be decisive in determining the fate of the present base. Nor can any present agreement affect that decision.

It has been suggested that West Indians should content themselves with temporary headquarters while awaiting independence. That might well be their best course and it would have the added advantage of allowing another suggestion to be put into effect. In the early years of the Federation, the parliamentary sessions could be held in different territories in order to give as wide a public as possible some first-hand experience of federal activities. In view of the oft-reported mass apathy towards federation this would seem to be a highly desirable plan.

DR. JAGAN'S COME-BACK

At the time of going to press, there is no firm information as to the make-up of the future government of British Guiana. Dr. Jagan and his faction of the People's Progressive Party have won nine of the 14 elected seats, but with only 48 per cent of the votes cast in a total poll of 55 per cent, a 3 per cent drop on the 1953 figures. The Burnhamite faction has won the three Georgetown seats. The Governor has a right to nominate up to eleven members. The normal procedure would be (for the Governor) to nominate sufficient members to ensure Dr. Jagan a working majority. This is (still) the likely course, but in view of the suspension of the constitution in 1953, the Governor will have to be convinced that Dr. Jagan intends to work the constitution and not to sabotage.

The election was fought largely on racial lines. Dr. Jagan's strength is among the East Indian workers on the sugar estates; East Indians represent nearly half the population. Mr. Burnham was supported by the urban voters of African descent. The result also indicates the failure of the plans of the interim government to promote economic development, to establish local government and build effective democratic organisations such as the trade unions and the co-operatives.

End of the Beginning in Nigeria

By MARJORIE NICHOLSON

ON August 8th Eastern and Western Nigeria became self-governing within the limits of their regional powers. If all goes according to plan, the Federal House of Representatives will meet on September 2nd with a Nigerian Prime Minister and an all-Nigerian front bench.

These are the first-fruits of the London Conference. They are not what the people of Nigeria had been led to expect. 'Self-government in 1956,' the slogan adopted in 1953, was watered down to 1957 when Dr. Azikiwe's Bank Inquiry prevented the promised Conference being held last year. This year, in face of the steady insistence of the Northern Ministers that their Region would not be 'ready' until 1959, the three Regional Premiers and Dr. Endeley of the Southern Cameroons agreed on 1959 for the target. At the Conference itself they stated that they appreciated that the solution of the various problems that must be disposed of before independence would take longer than they thought and settled on a date 'not later than April 2nd, 1960.' This sequence of events, entirely of Nigerian making, reveals the futility of making a fetish of dates for independence without adequate consideration of the political and administrative requirements. The leaders have only themselves to blame if their constituents protest that promises are not kept. (The East, in any case, received 'freedom on a platter of gold' from Dr. Azikiwe in 1953, so any further achievement seems to be merely gilding the lily.) It is therefore pointless to revile the Secretary of State for refusing to commit the United Kingdom, in advance, to do more than promise to meet a request for independence in 1960 'in a reasonable and practical manner.' The ball is in Nigerian hands.

Substance of Power Transferred

In fact, behind the customary façade of bitter and cynical comment, Nigeria is doing very well. In Eastern and Western Nigeria there are to-day no officials acting as 'Ministers'; the Governors do not attend Executive Council and will not use discretionary powers except on the advice of their Ministers or in the event of legislation being passed which might impede the operation of the Federal Government within its sphere or endanger the continuance of federal government. The Northern Region, at present preoccupied with major changes in provincial administration, will work towards the same stage in 1959. At the centre, the Governor-General will continue to preside over the Council of Ministers, but the three official members will be dropped. A Prime Minister commanding a majority in the House of Representatives is to be appointed, and the other Ministers will be selected on his advice. Even before legislation has been passed to amend the constitution as agreed by the London Conference, the substance of power will be in Nigerian hands if it is taken.

It is only necessary to go back ten years to estimate the magnitude of this achievement. In 1947, the Richards Constitution brought the North for the first time into the Legislative Council, set up advisory regional assemblies, and in the absence of a franchise outside Lagos and Calabar, made the first steps towards representative government in the rest of the country by a curious system of selection by provincial bodies. In 1947, there were two African members of Executive Council, both nominated, and the Executive Council was an advisory body. There was not a single democratically elected town or county council in the country—native authorities and township advisory boards were the order of the day. There were no well-organised political parties in the sense in which these exist to-day, and political feeling, in so far as it sought expression through modern media, was voiced principally through the tribal and cultural associations and the press. It is illuminating now to look back at the memorandum submitted to the Secretary of State by the N.C.N.C. Delegation which visited London in that year: Nigeria should be divided into eight protectorates, each with its own Governor and legislature, and there should be a central Parliament and Cabinet with a Governor-General; during a period of ten years the administration should be conducted by an 'Anglo-Nigerian condominium,' to be followed by five years in which there should be an Interim Nigerian Government which would eventually conclude a treaty of alliance with Britain making Nigeria a self-governing Dominion of the British Commonwealth. Even the terminology casts light on the political atmosphere of the day, in which such demands could be regarded as revolutionary, and Dr. Azikiwe as irresponsible and dangerous. The ten years are up, and there is every hope that the projected five-year period to follow will be reduced to three.

The great constitutional and administrative changes that have taken place are paralleled in political life. In 1947 the N.C.N.C. demonstrated a belief in the unity of Nigeria by choosing its delegation from every region in the country, but this gesture was largely symbolic. In the north a certain Malam Abubakar Tafawa Balewa made the historic pronouncement: 'We do not know them—we do not recognise them, and we share no responsibility in their actions. We do not consider these people at all.' He added that if Britain quitted Nigeria at that stage, before the North was ready for independence, 'the Northern people would continue their interrupted conquest to the sea.' Ten years later, Federal Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa is quite happy to serve in a Government with a majority of N.C.N.C. members, and has done so with such success that he is tipped as first Prime Minister of all Nigeria. It would be possible to dismiss the present degree of unity as superficial, to suggest that only a small class at the top is interested in politics and that for reasons of personal

gain. It would be possible, but also futile and untrue. Those who are unimpressed by the apparatus of ministries, legislatures, political parties and a nearly democratic franchise might usefully look back at the press. The screaming vituperation of the nationalist press, the frigid hostility of official publications, have both gone. Nigeria has the best newspapers in West Africa, written by men who clearly pay some regard to the intelligence of their readers. Even the bitter criticism of corruption and incompetence which is heard on every side is an indication that political leaders and rulers are not thought to be gods but to be ultimately accountable to their people. If political life has a flavour of eighteenth-century England, it has also the merits of the period, which were not inconsiderable.

Enquiry into Separate States

Why, then, should Mr. Lennox-Boyd refuse to give a date? The fact is that Nigeria has a peculiarly difficult problem of federal representation to solve. The three Regions adopted as units in 1947 were administrative expressions rather than coherent entities, but the operation of regional government has given them political reality. The various constitutional conferences held between 1949 and 1951 retained them as the basis of the Macpherson Constitution, and the leaders' conferences in 1953 and 1954 confirmed the structure and emphasised the division of the country by regionalising the civil service and the marketing boards. By 1957, a Region has become so strong an entity that it is extremely difficult to contemplate the creation of new Regions. Yet there was always some substance in the old N.C.N.C. doctrine of a larger number of smaller regions, with a consequently stronger centre. Even regional self-government is feared in some quarters as a possible step towards breaking up the country. Add to this the failure to secure sufficient unity at the centre to form a fully responsible Federal Government and the resentment of minority elements within the Regions at the alleged domination of majority groups, and it is only to be expected that demands for more states should recur. First to split off from the Eastern Region was the Southern Cameroons, now to be elevated to full regional status. Then the Western Regional legislature actually agreed in principle to the formation of a Benin-Delta State, while in the North the Middle Belt Region and in the East the Ogoja-Rivers-Calabar State became serious propositions.

The reasons for which separate states are demanded are naturally confused. None of the Nigerian politicians or parties pays due respect to the individual citizen, and this harshness in the use of power, obnoxious in any context, becomes dangerous in a country in which family, clan and 'tribal' allegiances have not yet given way completely to national consciousness. The cry of 'liberty' becomes completely confused with the old propaganda for 'ethnic' states, and at worst reinforces prejudices which are incompatible with the successful working of a parliamentary system. Similarly, the desire to prevent any Region from becoming strong enough

to secede from the Federation merges into proposals to break up the North, which has more than half the area and population of the whole country, or the West, where the governing party, the Action Group, has appeared to be primarily interested in regional rather than national organisation. Issues of this character are sufficiently difficult to break up any conference, and it is more surprising that the Conference survived than that it failed to register unanimity. The decision¹ that a Commission of Enquiry should be appointed was a sensible one. The Commission is to ascertain the facts about minority fears 'whether well or ill founded,' and, if no other solution meets the case, to make recommendations for the creation of one more state within each Region, with the caveat that before agreeing to any such recommendation the United Kingdom Government would take into account the effect on existing Regions and on the Federation as a whole.

In practice, other developments may overtake the issue of separate states in the next few years. The new provincial structure in the Northern Region may provide just the degree of control at the lower levels that the critics of the Regional Government desire, and the improved system of election to the Regional legislature has already begun to provide representation for opposition opinions at the top. At the Conference the Northern delegates agreed only to adult male suffrage for elections to the House of Representatives, but the addendum that 'the franchise in the Northern Region should be reviewed from time to time' provides the first gleam of hope for the women. Similarly, the full impact is yet to be felt of the excellent decision taken in 1953 that elections to the Federal House should be direct. Already the regional blocs which originally made the central machinery unworkable have been broken in the West and the East, with the natural corollary that the Action Group, which began as an admittedly regional party, has successfully put up candidates in both the East and the North and is on the way to becoming a national party. Such developments as these, together with the Conference decision to establish an upper house at the centre (though the principles of its formation are confused), pave the way for the accommodation in the Federal legislature and Government of both population and regional claims without which a federal structure cannot be operated.

The 'Greater To-morrow'

The future now hangs on the successful working of the new Federal Government and the wise handling of minority claims. Can Nigeria achieve both? Dr. Azikiwe has said that regional self-government is the 'end of the beginning.' If politicians can learn that differences of opinion are not met either by corruption or by threats, it does seem reasonable, in the light of the advances made in the last ten years, to believe in the 'greater to-morrow.'

¹ For this and other decisions see *Report by the Nigeria Constitutional Conference*, Cmd. 207, H.M. Stationery Office, 2s. 6d.

A Matter of Conscience

By ARTHUR GAITSKELL

THERE are two strains in imperial history. Working together they could make a policy for the future; opposed they cause confusion.

One, which we practised for a century in India, is to build up a people to run their own affairs, offering them what we hold precious for ourselves and common to all mankind. British people to-day may not know that, written in great letters in the central government buildings in Delhi are these words:—

'Queen Victoria said, in their prosperity will be our strength, in their contentment our security, and in their gratitude our best reward.'

And also:—

'Liberty will not descend to a people. A people must raise themselves to liberty. It is a blessing that must be earned before it can be enjoyed.'

There were always arguments about timing, and why not—for stability depends upon good administration and cohesion, and these cannot easily be-pass time and experience.

This policy we have practised in many lands, passing from mandates to transfer of power, from Empire to Commonwealth. This was the 'Voice of Britain.' We have been proud of it. Only recently our ambassador in U.S.A. was voicing this pride, drawing a contrast between our way towards self-determination and the Russian way towards denial of it.

Two Strains of Imperialism

But our Ambassador has said nothing about another strain in our imperial history. This other strain is typified by Cecil Rhodes and Africa. It led to settlement, and this in time to claims that Colonial Office rule—in other words our Empire policy—was wrong. The paramountcy of the Native majority interest was questioned, control over the future sought by the settler minority, and British immigration encouraged to strengthen their position.

Which is the strain suited to our age? To-day in East and Central Africa, except for Southern Rhodesia, we still have responsibility to the African peoples, who await the implementation of our traditional policy. What is our answer to them? The choice is before us whether or not to stand upon the principles we traditionally hold (and proclaim with pride), of building up a people to run their own affairs. It is possible for us to do so, and to call upon the minority of local Europeans to join us.

So far we have chosen not to do so. We have preferred to say to the African majority, 'This is a special case. To avoid racial fears among the Europeans we cannot admit the logic of their being a minority to you.'

As far as can be seen, when African opinion has been expressed, it has shown a marked preference for our traditional policy, and a marked suspicion of this new compromise of multi-racialism and partnership as political concepts. It is an important moment in the Western world's relationship with Africa to

think once again whether it is right to stick to those principles and to fit the European minority to the African majority.

But at this moment of decision, concerned more with the fears of Europeans than of Africans, we have the joint announcement of the United Kingdom and the Federal Government following discussions between Mr. Lennox-Boyd, Lord Home and Sir Roy Welensky, suggesting that further power is to be handed over to the Central African Federal Government, whose leaders have given their own interpretation of partnership as one in which the white minority, although less than ten per cent of the population, will never have less than fifty per cent of political power.

The federation itself, in spite of known African opposition to it, is to be further crystallised by independent representation overseas. The British and Federal Governments say they are opposed to any right of secession, although Africans in Nyasaland have expressed a desire to secede.

The British and Federal Governments say equally that they are opposed to amalgamation into a unitary state. Nevertheless, a principle has been accepted that all Civil Services in the Federation, whether federal or territorial, will eventually be locally based and looked for their future to the federal area. Personnel from our colonial service, whose recent job has been to build up processes of democracy and to train people for self-management, are to be replaced by officials responsible to the Federal Government with its own interpretation of future African political evolution.

At present proposals for federal franchise emanate only from the white Federal Government, and the British Government say they have given an undertaking not to initiate any legislation to deal with any matter within the competence of the Federal Legislature, except at the request of the Federal Government. Unless this act of abdication over future federal policy is countered by African advancement in the territorial governments, it is difficult to see how the conference in 1960 can represent African opinion at all.

Some hold that the white minority are liberal and have the true benefit of the Africans at heart. But the constant denigration of our traditional policy by the leaders of the white community does not suggest much sympathy with building up a people to manage their own affairs.

Is this, then, the time to give up our own responsibilities and transfer further power to them? Has the 'Voice of Britain' changed? Has the word 'protectorate' ceased to have a meaning? Does nobody to-day really care for our honour? And if we desert our own democratic principles, but the Africans seek them as an objective, are we to acquiesce in seeing them repressed, treating as sedition with our right hand what we are trying to encourage as patriotism with our left?

'THE Malay is a Muhammadan and looks to his Raja as the ruling authority. The ballot box makes no appeal, and self-government has no attractions. If we could order him differently, give him a new idea of life, we should only make him unhappy.'¹

Malayans . . . know that national unity in the accepted sense of the term cannot be expected for generations, but they are not prepared to wait. There are few demands for immediate and absolute independence. The difficulties are clearly seen, but they are not regarded as reasons for maintaining the *status quo*. The demands are for political development to some stage between absolute independence and complete self-government. Perhaps some measure of local autonomy which will give dignity to a dependent people.'²

The above quotations indicate the astonishingly rapid change that has taken place in the political climate of post-war Malaya through the emergence of the Alliance Party. The first federal elections took place in 1955 for 52 members in a Federal Legislative Assembly of 98 members, presided over by a Speaker. The Alliance won 51 seats and immediately urged the British Government to discuss further constitutional advance.

The British Connection

It is a point in time from which to look back on British policy and administration. Our association goes back to the end of the eighteenth century when the British East India Company was fighting the Dutch company's monopoly of trade in the East. A harbour and trading station was needed, and the island of Penang, almost uninhabited, was acquired by means of an annual payment, from the Sultan of Kedah in 1786. Sir Stamford Raffles recognised the great possibilities of the swampy, sparsely populated island of Singapore, and on behalf of the East India Company, he made an agreement with the Sultan of Johore to develop the island as a port. Raffles had a vision of education, of literature and the arts, as well as commerce, and he laid the foundation of the Raffles Institute in 1823; in 1949 it was incorporated in the University of Malaya. Malacca was ceded by the Dutch in 1824, and by 1829 the three areas of Penang, Malacca and Singapore became the Colony of the Straits Settlements and were administered from India until 1867, when they were transferred to the control of the Colonial Office. Up till 1874, the British Government was determined to avoid interference with the Malay States. The feudal Sultanates had declined into a state of anarchy, piracy flourished unchecked, and the people had to bear the burden of local wars, forced labour and debt-slavery. When the British intervened it was with the full consent of the Rulers, and between 1874 and 1909 British Residents were appointed to the nine

States with instructions to advise on all questions other than those touching Malay religion and custom. The whole area was divided into three political groups, the Straits Settlements, which formed a colony, the four federated Malay States and the five unfederated Malay States which were under British protection. This set-up remained unchanged until 1946 when the United Kingdom Government created Singapore a separate colony, because of its overwhelmingly Chinese population which upset the racial balance of Malays and Chinese in the Federation. By the Federation of Malaya Agreement of 1948, each State and Settlement retained its own individuality, but all were united under a strong central government. Each of the Malay States had its own nominated council presided over by the Ruler, and Penang and Malacca had their own nominated legislatures.

As in other territories before the Second World War, the British administration was concerned with establishing law and order, building roads and railways, developing ports, electricity and water supplies, drainage and irrigation. There was an inadequate provision of social services, particularly education. Government Malay schools were set up in all the states. The Chinese established and maintained their own schools with teachers and text-books provided by China, resulting in a Chinese-orientated curriculum. On the rubber estates, the owners were required, with a small grant from the Government, to provide schools for Tamil Indian labourers. In 1947, a new education plan was adopted by the Federal Legislative Council to establish national schools with a *Malayan* education designed to weld together the three communities. In schools using Tamil or Mandarin as the medium of instruction, the teaching of Malay and English is compulsory. The expansion of education from primary school to the university has been materially assisted by grants from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund.

Capitalist Enterprise

The economic development of the country was left to private enterprise which concentrated mainly on tin and rubber to the neglect of agriculture. For centuries the Chinese had mined tin, although exports were limited owing to the anarchic conditions in the Malay States and lack of communications. The Chinese were responsible for 80 per cent. of the output up to 1912, but by 1956 the balance had changed and the Europeans (mainly British) owned 58 per cent. of the production.

Rubber was introduced on a small scale in 1897, and by 1956 the production had risen to 626,000 tons with a net export value of approximately £164m. Of the 3.5m. acres of land under rubber, 2m. acres represent European and Asian estates—the labour is mainly Indian—and 1.5m. Asian small-holdings, mainly Malay. In May, 1955, the Federal Legislative Council decided on the expenditure of approximately £35m. to assist large-scale replanting with high-yield-

¹ *British Malaya* by Sir Frank Swettenham, 1946.

² *Stalemate in Malaya*, *The Times*, Oct. 1st, 1953.

ing trees; approximately £14m. was allocated to the improvement of small-holdings. There is an urgent need to develop co-operative small-holdings. Although there has been progress in the organisation of co-operation (rural credit societies 48,165 members, land and farming, 3,488 members, processing and marketing 20,950 members) the numbers are still pitifully small compared to the need. Independent Malaya will have to plan an all-out effort to revolutionise a backward and neglected agrarian economy which is responsible for the poverty of the Malays.

Power Transferred

The Malaya Independence Bill³ was passed by the House of Commons in July. The constitutional proposals⁴ before the House of Commons were based on the Report of the Reid Commission, but several important amendments had been agreed. The Bill was warmly welcomed by Government and Opposition Members, but questions were raised on the future of economic aid, citizenship rights, language and the special position of the Malays.

Citizenship is the key question, and here a compromise has been agreed by the Federation Government and the Alliance party. Anyone who was a citizen of the Federation before Merdeka and everyone who is born there after August 31st, 1957, will have Federation citizenship as a right. All citizens of the Federation, after independence, will be Commonwealth citizens, and no one is required to give up a second citizenship in order to continue to be a citizen of the Federation.

The objections of the Malays to the granting of Commonwealth citizenship have been met by complex provisions. Federation citizens may forfeit their citizenship of Malaya if they exercise in a foreign country 'rights afforded exclusively to its citizens.'

All persons who were *born* in the Federation before Merdeka, providing that they take the oath of allegiance and declare that they will not exercise any rights under the nationality laws of any foreign country and have resided in the Federation for five out of the preceding seven years, can register as citizens. A period of absence from the Federation for purposes of education, if approved by the responsible Minister, will be treated as residence in the Federation.

It is proposed that persons who were not born in the Federation but who are *resident* on Merdeka Day and intend to make Malaya their permanent home should obtain citizenship by 'a process akin to naturalisation.' The applicant has to satisfy citizenship requirements which include eight years' residence out of the previous twelve, taking the oath of loyalty and an elementary knowledge of Malay, but will be accepted only at the discretion of the Minister in charge and not of right. This last condition was not included in the Report of the Reid Commission and there is likely to be considerable

criticism by the Chinese of this additional barrier to the acquisition of citizenship.

The Parliament of the Federation will consist of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, or Supreme Head of the Federation (who will be elected by the Nine Rulers from among themselves by secret ballot and who will hold office for five years), the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Senate will consist of 22 members elected by the eleven State Assemblies and 16 members nominated by the Paramount Ruler representing special interests. The House of Representatives will consist of 100 members elected on a territorial basis from single member constituencies. The next election is to be held after January 1st, 1959, probably in 1960, to give time for the registration of new citizens. The duration of each Parliament is to be five years subject to the power of the Paramount Ruler to dissolve Parliament. The delimitation of constituencies and the conduct of both Federal and State elections will be the responsibility of a permanent Election Commission. The Rulers of the nine States must accept the advice of their Chief Ministers who are responsible to the Assembly. Governors will be appointed for Penang and Malacca by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong after consultation with the Chief Minister of the Settlement.

Malay Rights

The special position of the Malays is recognised by the decision that Malay should be the national language and Islam the State religion. English is to be retained as an official language for at least the next ten years. Malay land rights are entrenched in the constitution, though there is a general safeguard that the total area of land in a State declared as a Malay reservation must not at any time exceed the total area of land in that State which has been made available for general alienation. The special privileges with regard to Malay quotas in the public service, the granting of scholarships and bursaries, permits and licences to carry on certain businesses will be safeguarded by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. As Head of the State he will review Malay privileges from time to time on the advice of the Cabinet.

Finally, the constitution provides for an independent judiciary and appeals to the Privy Council will continue to lie from the Supreme Court of the Federation. Proper provision has been made for an independent and impartial public service. Expatriate officers in senior administrative and technical posts will continue until at least 1965. Any change in the constitution must be approved by two-thirds of both Houses of Parliament and the State Assemblies.

The constitution is a workman-like job and probably as fair to all the communities as human effort can make it, but it can only be a framework. Great tolerance and understanding by all the three races will be needed if political democracy is to take root and economic and social advance are to be achieved. An independent Malaya is launched with the goodwill of the British people and the Commonwealth; the future depends on racial co-operation.

³Hansard, 12th and 19th July, 1957.

⁴H.M.S.O., Cmd. 210, 5s. 6d.

THE PRESS AND GHANA

THE sharp reaction throughout the Commonwealth to the deportation order made against Mr. Bankole Timothy was probably more than Dr. Nkrumah bargained for. It was not less than the occasion deserved.

Mr. Timothy, a Sierra Leone journalist, is the widely respected deputy-editor of the *Daily Graphic*. On July 31st he was ordered to leave the country, which he had made his home, within 48 hours as his presence was 'not conducive to the public good.' No charges were specified. But at the same time, deportation orders were also announced against two Muslim leaders, Alhaji Amadu Baba and Alhaji Larden Lalemie.

These events have generally been interpreted as reflecting a 'get tough' policy by Dr. Nkrumah, who is anxious to discipline his Convention People's Party at a time of internal dissension and to show a brave front in face of signs of growing opposition in the country.

In reply to a telegram from the Commonwealth Press Union, Mr. Kofi Baako, the 31-year-old and newly-promoted Minister of Information and Broadcasting, has stated Dr. Nkrumah's position. Mr. Timothy, he explained, was not deported because he was a journalist but 'because the Government has good reasons for his deportation.' The Government would 'not tolerate any subversive activities by anyone, no matter what his profession.' Mr. Baako referred to the hostility of the foreign press and 'foul and unfounded news about Ghana and her people.' 'One wonders if those foreign papers which are now against the deportation of Mr. Bankole Timothy wish us to be confirmed in our suspicion that he was sent out here to cause confusion in Ghana?'

This is hardly an adequate explanation, failing as it does to state the manner in which Mr. Timothy misbehaved. It makes Dr. Nkrumah's assurances that freedom of the press in Ghana is not in danger, unconvincing.

The problems of freedom and authority that arise in establishing a new nation are obviously different from those of a stable society with a long democratic tradition. And politicians the world over are notoriously sensitive to the power without responsibility which they associate with the Press. This may account for Dr. Nkrumah's loss of patience with a journalist who has not hesitated to criticise him when criticism seemed due. But it does not excuse a wrongful act. To criticise a Prime Minister is not sedition, to embarrass him is not to disrupt the State. Dr. Nkrumah should reflect on this and know that many good friends of his have been disturbed by the unhappy incident of Mr. Timothy.

Correspondence

CENTRAL AFRICAN FEDERATION

To the Editor of *Venture*

Sir,—The article on Central Africa by Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas and John Hatch in the July issue of *Venture* does good service in clarifying the legal posi-

tion, in underlining the practical difficulties in the way of a reversal of the process of federation, and in stressing the importance of concentrating efforts between now and 1960 on a liberalisation of the constitutions of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. There is one point, however, of which no mention is made and that is the present dominant position of Southern Rhodesia in the Federal Assembly.

Commenting on the proposed composition of the Federal Assembly in the 1953 debate, the Rt. Hon. James Griffiths¹ said: 'First, it was understood, and it is now embodied in the scheme, that the status of Southern Rhodesia as a self-governing colony was to be protected in the Preamble. Secondly, it was to be further protected by the dominant position accorded to Southern Rhodesia in the Federal Government. She has only a third of the population of these three Territories, but she has nearly half the members in the Legislative Council. On what grounds? Not on grounds of population, nor on grounds of wealth, but on the ground that it was essential to give her that position so that her status should be preserved.'

In the present assembly, Southern Rhodesia has 17 representatives out of a total of 35, and this proportion is preserved in the proposals just published for an enlarged House, in which she will have 29 out of 59.

This special weighting for Southern Rhodesia in the Assembly is one of the main causes of uneasiness amongst Africans and is a matter which surely must come under review at the 1960 Conference. There was some justification for the arrangement when Federation was introduced, but as soon as we begin to discuss Dominion status, the obligation to preserve the self-governing status of Southern Rhodesia loses validity. If the approach to independence within the Commonwealth were accompanied by the two parallel lines of progress, greater participation by the Africans of the northern territories in their own Government through a more liberal franchise and wider representation, and an equitable division of the seats in the Federal House on a population basis, the Federal situation might become much more acceptable to African opinion.

T. F. Betts

¹ Hansard 513/679.

Fabian Colonial Bureau

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25th—27th October

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COMMONSENSE FROM KENYA

IN recent times we have had put forward a bewildering variety of electoral and constitutional devices for the territories of East and Central Africa. Yet in spite of their differences they have all been about one main issue: the safeguards for racial minorities in the face of African political advancement. The difficulty is to decide whether those safeguards should be embodied at the level of the franchise and the constituency, or within the Legislature itself. Mr. Tom Mboya and his colleagues have in their recent statements brought some clarity to this situation as far as Kenya is concerned. They insist first of all that political progress cannot be planned until political objectives have been defined, and they ask that the British Government shall make an unequivocal declaration that it aims at the creation of a fully democratic system in Kenya. They accept without cavil that in the present state of political thought and prejudice in the different communities some specific safeguards for racial minorities are unavoidable and that for a time these will have to take the form of devices which would be considered artificial and improper in a true egalitarian democracy. But, they say, the main, in fact the only valid, safeguard already exists in the balance held by the official members in the Legislature which for some times to come they wish to see preserved. Devices of communal representation or of reserved seats with a common roll will only exacerbate racial rivalries in the Kenya atmosphere.

End of European Parity

It may, therefore, seem illogical that at this immediate stage they should be pressing for a considerable increase in African communal representation and by this means for the replacement of European by African parity on the representative side of the Legislature. Their argument, however, is based on the physical difficulties under which the present eight members work. They point to the fact that each of them represents an average of three-quarters of a million African people and that in the Central Province one African represents two million. They underline the difficulty of maintaining contact where the majority of constituents are illiterates and the constituencies themselves are geographically large and ill served by communications. The parity issue is more one of prestige. It is a point on which the Europeans have always insisted, and up to now have successfully maintained, although with the official side holding the balance it has little meaning in terms of political power. Given a declaration of political objectives by the British Government, for which they claim a precedent in Uganda, and the adjustment in the number of African seats, the African members will be willing to participate in talks on constitutional adjustment. They are not willing to accept the ministerial portfolios offered them under the Lyttelton Constitution to which they claim they were not a party, because the present distribution of portfolios bears no relationship to the proposed representation in the Legislature and the

nature of the portfolios offered is tinged with racialism. They are willing to hold a new African communal election to fill the new seats under the existing qualitative and multiple franchise, provided the registration lists are first re-opened to enable African interest in politics, greatly stimulated by recent events, to take its effect. They envisage in the not too distant future the abolition of all communal seats and the conduct of elections throughout the country on a common roll in geographical constituencies with universal franchise. When this stage is reached they propose that the minorities be protected by the incorporation of a Bill of Rights in the constitution and by the retention for a period of a number of nominated members for special interest in the Legislature.

The European Elected Members Association have indicated that they would be willing to consider an increase in the number of African members and the sacrifice of European parity, provided that the African will first agree to enter the Government under the Lyttelton Constitution and will accept a standstill agreement on constitutional change for a given period. Both these conditions are, for obvious reasons, totally unacceptable to the African members, but more important, the Africans doubt the value of the European statement. They point out that on one ground or another several European members, Mr. Cooke and Mr. Havelock for example, have already expressed disagreement with the proposals and that there is no guarantee that if the African members enter into discussions on them they will be adhered to by the backwoodsmen on whom the European members depend for electoral support and to whom they are always liable to surrender. And they say that they would have more faith in European attitudes if the more liberal ideas put forward in private by European members recently in London were openly expressed and adhered to on public platforms in Kenya. Mr. Mboya and his colleagues insist, therefore, that the time has come for Mr. Lennox-Boyd to reassume the initiative of the ultimate governing power surrendered by Mr. Lyttelton in the 1952 declaration. His impending visit to Kenya should initiate an official round-table conference on the country's political future.

T. F. Betts

APPEAL

Extra Mural Department of Makere College, Kenya Branch. The Tutor is very much in need of books and pamphlets for the building up of an Extra-Mural library. Students are enrolled in 27 courses covering Appreciation of Art, International Affairs, Constitutional Law, Shakespeare and Shaw, British Way of Life, Introduction to Psychology, History, Better English, etc. Would members and subscribers send literature to the Resident Tutor, P.O. Box 8214, Nairobi, Kenya, or to the Fabian Colonial Bureau, who will forward all publications.

Guide to Books . . .

Politics and Economics in Asia

Development for Free Asia

By Maurice Zinkin (Chatto and Windus, 21s.)

Nationalism and Communism in East Asia

By W. MacMahon Ball (Cambridge University Press, 30s.)

AGAIN we are indebted to the Institute of Pacific Relations for two first-class books on Asia, published under their auspices. When Americans have access to such expert sources of information such as these, the British student of Asian affairs may well marvel at the failure of their policies in Asia in the post-war period.

Professor MacMahon Ball, of the University of Melbourne, surveys all the territories from India to Japan with the exception of Pakistan and Ceylon. He sets down his premises in the opening chapter: the revolution is a revolt against foreign control and colonialism; a claim for full national independence; a revolt against poverty and misery; a racial revolt against the West. The new nations of the East will seek their own ends and no longer be instruments of Western policy. There are some 700 million people who have refused to align themselves with the Soviet Union or the West, and the author suggests that the uncommitted nations may tip the balance of world power. He urges the need for Western unity and unity between the West and the non-communist Eastern nations. Since the war, western power in Asia has been transferred to the United States. Britain has gained in prestige through her withdrawal from the Indian sub-continent and is, at this moment, relinquishing power over her last major Asian colony, Malaya. But the Americans, who have taken over with their emotional sense of a mission, find it difficult to believe in the happiness and progress of people who do not conform to the American way of life and their economic and political pattern. They are consistent in their conviction that communism is always bad, that it means enslavement for the Asian people as well as danger for western democracies. In spite of the experience with Chiang Kai-Shek, where the disastrous results of giving economic aid to a government whose sole qualification was anti-communism were seen, a similar policy is being pursued in Formosa, South Korea and the Philippines. The consequence is the stirring of national and racial resentment, and suspicion of western democracy. The author urges an economic and technical aid programme, without political or military strings, with emphasis on a stable price for key exports. 'Stable export incomes for the countries of East Asia would do more than any defence pact, to reduce the danger of communist expansion.' SEATO has never been popular in this country. Our job is to persuade our Government to give more aid through the Colombo Plan, and

support international action on the stabilisation of export commodity prices.

Mr. Zinkin has the advantage of a detailed knowledge of India through his years in the Civil Service, for which he has a high respect. He is concerned with the Eastern peasant, living in a community which is largely self-governing through its village council, and though exploited by landlords and money-lenders, and often corrupt officials, yet well aware that he is the backbone of society and resistant to change. His leaders are determined on economic development, determined on changing society, and slowly there is an awakening, a demand for a fuller life, for enough to eat, for literacy, for medical help. How is development to be achieved—by persuasion, the Indian way, by force, the Chinese way or by autocratic direction, the Japanese method. The book is a profound examination of the economic, political and social problems which have to be weighed in the price to be paid for development. Of particular interest are the chapters on 'Co-operation and Credit' and 'Community Projects.' Over and over again the message is repeated, the need for dedicated officials who must have knowledge, patience and perseverance to discover what the peasants really want for themselves, and then to help them to achieve it. Useless to take the short cut and tell them they need a school when they want a road or a clinic. Useless to ignore in the organisation of credit societies for productive borrowing, that for another generation there will be a need for unproductive borrowing. The Hindu custom will change slowly whereby daughters cannot be married without jewellery and village feasts; parents cannot be buried without extravagant ceremonial. Peasants must be provided with an institution through which they can save for social obligations. We do not need to be convinced that co-operation is the only possible way for the peasant to increase production and pay for social welfare, but for those of us who do not know the Indian village, the enormous difficulties of educating members and officials of co-operative societies have hardly been appreciated. The author vividly gets across the contrast in the standards of living of East and West; he reminds us that a *middle-class* farmer, owning his own land; with a family of five, will make a total income from cash and subsistence crops of about £130 a year, the equivalent of our old age pension.

If Asia is to develop it requires 'the talent, the effort, the innovations, the willingness to change of all its people, women as well as men, religious minorities as well as religious majorities, untouchables as well as touchables, poor as well as rich.' What Europe has done, Asia can do.

Hilda Selwyn-Clarke

West Africa and the Commonwealth

By Dennis Austen (Penguin, 2s.)

The great merit of this little book is that it does not treat of West Africa in isolation but as an integral part of the evolving history of the Commonwealth. Indeed, it is one of the best accounts I have come across of its development and nature.

The theme of the book is that Crown Colony Government, which was originally intended as an alternative to representative Government in British settled colonies, in fact became assimilated into the same stream. The turning point was Ceylon, where the Legislative Council was gradually converted into a Parliament based on a wide franchise.

The author makes a just comparison between the Donoughmore Report on Ceylon in 1924 and the Durham Report on Canada. Both represented the same sort of constitutional turning point in the history of the Commonwealth; both applied the same principle of legislative independence leading to sovereign nationhood. The great importance of the Donoughmore Report is that its acceptance determined that non-European dependencies should enter into the Commonwealth in exactly the same way as Canada, Australia and the older European nations of the Commonwealth.

In West Africa a further struggle had to be fought out between the Donoughmore idea and the Lugard idea of indirect rule. The author attributed the tendency towards regional disintegration in West Africa to the rearguard action of the believers in indirect rule through chiefs. The decisive constitutional factor was that the Crown Colony principle prevailed with its logical outcome in full independence.

The author also discusses, briefly but convincingly, the internal developments in West Africa that created the pressure for political change. He emphasises the extraordinary speed of economic and social changes. The radical lower middle class that provided the new leaders and the articulate support for the nationalist movements was not in existence at all fifty years ago. The proletariat is not yet involved in West African politics.

As regards the future, the author inclines to the view that present political boundaries, despite their historical artificiality, will persist, because nationalism has arisen within them.

He has little doubt that the new West African nations will remain in the Commonwealth. He has an excellent section on the advantages of membership which go far beyond dollars.

The author has sharp things to say about the conflict between South African policies and the principles of the Commonwealth, but has no proposals for action.

P. C. Gordon Walker

The Smaller Territories

(The Labour Party, 9d.)

THIS pamphlet deals with those British colonies which 'are too small or possess insufficient resources of wealth or manpower to become full sovereign nations of the Commonwealth.' Some 33

territories are listed as coming within this category; their populations, totalling nearly 13 millions, vary between 2.4 millions (Hong Kong), 2 millions (Sierra Leone), 1½ millions (Singapore), and a few hundreds (Pitcairn, Tristan da Cunha, etc.). It is assumed that the inhabitants of even the smallest colonies should have the opportunity of achieving full democratic self-determination, preferably within the Commonwealth, but that there is a limit of size, wealth, and population below which national independence is impossible, and that in addition the Commonwealth Prime Ministers would not be prepared to accept such territories as full member states. The existence of borderline cases is admitted, e.g. Sierra Leone.

What is the answer? Dyarchy does not accord their inhabitants 'a full share of responsibility for all their affairs,' and is therefore ruled out as leading to 'dangerous unrest.' Federation is one solution: either with contiguous or neighbouring small territories, or with larger neighbours in or outside the Commonwealth, e.g. Singapore with Malaya, the Gambia with Sierra Leone and possibly part of French West Africa. Integration is another solution: with the United Kingdom, as in the still *sub judice* case of Malta, or with some neighbouring country, e.g. Greece if the Cypriots so wish. These possibilities being exhausted, what remains for the others?

It is suggested that Dominion Status, as it existed in 1931, 'in a sense . . . is vacant,' and that, if their inhabitants so wish, these colonies should 'be recognised by the British Government as Dominions.' It is then hoped that such 'dominions,' realising their own inadequacy, will voluntarily 'confide the conduct of foreign policy and defence' to the United Kingdom, or to some other full member of the Commonwealth.

No compulsion is to be exercised at any stage, and the right to opt out of the Commonwealth altogether, implicit in the grant of Dominion Status, is conceded. But not even the most approximate time-table is indicated for this process, and it is not clear what would happen if such a territory, having been granted Dominion Status, proceeded to exercise it fully and yet chose to remain within the Commonwealth. One may fairly ask how recently the authors of this pamphlet have actually read the Statute of Westminster, and how serious they are in implying that there is a valid analogy between Canada and Australia in 1931 and Tonga or the Seychelles in 1961? Surely 'voluntary dyarchy' would be nearer the mark than Dominion Status?

Nor do they offer specific criteria of political and economic viability, beyond the brief phrases 'too small' and 'insufficient resources of wealth and manpower.' They say nothing about the membership of such 'Dominions' in the Sterling Area, or of tariffs, quota agreements, etc. On the internal political and economic development of these territories they are strangely silent. If they believe that there is any connection between genuine democratic self-determination and social justice or economic progress they have not seen fit to avow it.

The strictly constitutional proposals contained in this pamphlet are ingenious and well meant but unconvincing. The word Socialism does not darken

its pages, and in most respects it could pass for an unusually competent publication by the Liberal Party, or even, except for a few betrayals of radical and democratic sentiment, as one of the less unenlightened products of the Conservative Central Office.

G. E. Aylmer

Guerrilla Communism in Malaya

By Lucian W. Pye (Oxford University Press, 45s.)

This book is one of several that have been written under the auspices of the Center of International Studies at Princeton University. They are concerned with finding out what the western world can do to counteract the attractions of Communism in the under-developed areas. The first two parts of the book are devoted to an intensive study of the People's Liberation Parties, how they differ from orthodox Communism and what influence they have had on the people in Malaya. It is in the third part, 'The Individuals,' containing the material which Mr. Pye gathered in his interviews with 63 young ex-Communists (Malayan-Chinese) that the author has made a real contribution to social and political science. Such a book could very easily have been just another dull sociological treatise, but Mr. Pye's treatment of his material, his keen analysis and understanding, have made it an outstanding one.

Cast adrift in childhood by war and enemy occupation, millions of people have become 'rootless' and have found status and material well-being in what the Communist parties have to offer. Mr. Pye's suggestions for counteracting the drift towards Communism may well be used in countries other than Malaya. He makes it plain that the Western countries will have to help these 'rootless' people to help themselves in social, economic and political fields if they wish to promote the democratic way of life.

Malaya—The Making of a Nation, H.M.S.O., 3s.6d.

This pamphlet provides basic information about the land and the peoples of the Federation, and describes briefly the events leading up to the acceptance by Britain of responsibilities in the territory. It reviews in a few pages the general development of the country since the nineteenth century and gives a more detailed account of the economic, social and political foundations of the new nation. The text is supplemented by a map and appendices dealing with

(1) employment and distribution of population, (2) the emergency in Malaya, (3) figures of imports and exports, (4) assistance from U.K. Colonial Development and welfare Funds, (5) co-operative societies, (6) local defence forces, (7) a summary of the recommendation of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission 1957, and (8) a short reading list.

Malaya Becomes a Sovereign Nation (H.M.S.O.)

Photoposter printed in colour, 1s. 6d. Picture Set —12 black and white, 7s. 6d.

Colour and Conscience

By John Darragh (Fabian Bookshop, 1s.6d.)

Mr. Darragh's pamphlet is 'A study of race relations and Colour prejudice in Birmingham,' based on a public opinion poll (1,000 white people and 1,000 coloured people). It shows an astonishing amount of racial prejudice among the white population of Birmingham, in both social and economic fields, and after reading this pamphlet no one can view the situation with complacency. The introduction is by Michael Banton, Professor of Social Anthropology at Edinburgh University, and while he does not agree completely with the findings of the poll, he does believe with Mr. Darragh that race relations constitute the most complex and important problem facing England to-day, that it will be the 'testing ground' of our professed democratic ideals, and that we must begin now, with actions, not words, to find a solution to the problem.

Mr. Darragh makes several concrete suggestions especially in regard to the West Indian immigration problems—housing, employment, social adjustment—in Birmingham, and he also includes a short bibliography which should encourage readers to go more deeply into the question of race relations.

Administration of the U.K. Dependencies and Labour in the U.K. Dependencies (pamphlets 22 and 23 issued by the Ministry of Information) are succinct and severely factual surveys of the situation to-day. Pamphlet 23 gives an excellent picture of the organisation of labour services, the development of colonial trade unions and statistics of membership. Although only about 6 per cent of colonial populations can be said to work as wage earners proper the very adequate framework of advisers and social services being built up should go far to smooth technological developments in the future.

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